Authors: Clark Devon R., Meffert Christopher S., Baggili Ibrahim, Breitinger Frank


Publisher: Digital Commons @ New Haven
Content Provider: University of New Haven: Digital Commons @ New Haven
The DJI Phantom III drone has already been used for malicious activities (to drop bombs, remote surveillance and plane watching) in 2016 and 2017. At the time of writing, DJI was the drone manufacturer with the largest market share. Our work presents the primary thorough forensic analysis of the DJI Phantom III drone, and the primary account for proprietary file structures stored by the examined drone. It also presents the forensically sound open source tool DRone Open source Parser (DROP) that parses proprietary DAT files extracted from the drone's nonvolatile internal storage. These DAT files are encrypted and encoded.
The work also shares preliminary findings on TXT files, which are also proprietary, encrypted, encoded, files found on the mobile device controlling the drone. These files provided a slew of data such as GPS locations, battery, flight time, etc. By extracting data from the controlling mobile device, and the drone, we were able to correlate data and link the user to a specific device based on extracted metadata. Furthermore, results showed that the best mechanism to forensically acquire data from the tested drone is to manually extract the SD card by disassembling the drone. Our findings illustrated that the drone should not be turned on as turning it on changes data on the drone by creating a new DAT file, but may also delete stored data if the drone's internal storage is full.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access article under CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0

Illustration Photo: DJI Phantom 3 (credits: Lee / Flickr Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.0 Generic (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0))


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